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  Financial historians have long been interested in explaining and analyzing the 
development of capital markets, and understanding the extent to which their development 
has a broader impact on growth rates for national economies. Recently, economists have 
been drawing on the insights of Schumpeter and earlier generations of scholars to re-
examine the relationship between financial sector development and economic growth, 
and to test it using new long-run, cross-country data sets.
1 This newer literature argues 
that a causal relationship between finance and growth exists: well-functioning capital 
markets make it easier to channel savings to investment projects with high rates of return, 
which in turn enable modern economic growth to occur. Hence, understanding the factors 
that encourage capital market development is a key question. 
  The geographical mobility of capital is critical to allocative efficiency. Legal or 
regulatory barriers, underdeveloped banking systems or financial markets, and 
technological hurdles can impede the flow of capital from borrowers to lenders across 
regions, while institutional innovations can accelerate the development of national capital 
markets. To better understand how national capital markets are forged, this article 
examines the process of capital market integration in Japan during the late-nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  
Japan’s experience is particularly illuminating for several reasons. First, although 
previous studies have examined the slow emergence of a national capital market in the 
U.S. during nineteenth century, comparatively little is known about the formation of 
national capital markets in other parts of the world.
2 Japan’s status as the second largest 
economy in the world economy and its location in Asia (where many of the fastest 
growing developing nations are presently located) make it a particularly interesting 
historical case for assessing how capital market integration takes place. Second, because 
the institutional development of the Japanese banking system during the late-nineteenth 
                                                 
1 See Levine (2005) for a review of the large literature on financial development and growth. For evidence 
on Japan, see Rousseau (1999). 
2 One exception is the case of Austria. See Good (1977).   2
century differed considerably from the process taking place in the United States at that 
time, Japan’s experience may shed light on factors that influence the formation of 
national capital markets but were non-existent or unimportant in the case of the U.S. In 
particular, since Meiji-era policymakers were explicitly attempting to modernize the 
Japanese economy and break from Japan’s feudal past, they experimented with new 
institutions, including the creation of a central bank in 1882 and its regional branches 
shortly thereafter and the development of commercial branch-banking networks.
3 Third, 
although existing (Japanese-language) studies by historians provide some suggestive 
evidence that a national capital market likely emerged in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries, our study is the first to analyze how convergence was influenced by 
competition, institutional developments, and a better flow of information (induced by 
both technological change and innovations in the banking industry such as branch 
banking).
4  
One significant impediment to understanding capital market integration in 
countries other than the U.S. has been the lack of regional data on capital flows, interest 
rates, or other series that would permit the testing of this process. Hence, to analyze 
capital market integration in Japan, we collected a new data set on lending rates of 
commercial banks from 1884 to 1925 for 47 Japanese prefectures. We combined these 
data with other characteristics of Japanese prefectures, including the competitiveness of 
the banking environment, access to information networks, and the existence of branches 
of the Bank of Japan.
5 Unlike many previous studies on interest rate convergence, our 
data set permits us to use panel econometrics to test explicitly the relative importance of 
competing hypotheses and show how a national market became increasingly integrated 
over a 40-year period.  
We first review the literature on capital market convergence and consider theories 
that may help explain the process of capital market integration in Japan. We then use 
                                                 
3 A number of studies have noted that the Meiji period represents a watershed for understanding how 
institutions contribute to economic growth and development and in forging a modern, open Japanese 
economy (Rousseau, 1999; Sussman and Yafeh, 1999; Bernhofen and Brown, 2004, 2005). 
4 For previous studies on Japanese financial markets and suggestive evidence of convergence during our 
sample period, see Lewis and Yamamura (1971), Okada (1966), Sugiyama (1965), Teranishi (2003, 2005), 
Tsurumi (1981, 1991), and Yamamura (1970).  
5 Using time-series techniques, Mitchener and Ohnuki (2007) show that the Japanese capital market 
exhibited considerable integration in the late nineteenth century.   3
fixed-effects and random-effects models to show that the establishment of branches of the 
Bank of Japan and the development of commercial branch-banking networks lowered the 
barriers to capital mobility in Japan during the Meiji and Taisho periods. These two 
findings suggest that institutional innovations can play a central role in forging national 
capital markets. Our findings also highlight the role played by information networks: the 
growing telegraphic transmissions of financial information appear to have accelerated 
capital market integration in Japan.  
 
II. Accounting for Capital Market Integration in Japan 
 
  Studies of capital market integration have employed a wide range of data series 
(prices, capital flows, and differences in savings and investment) and statistical 
techniques to assess the pace and timing of national integration. Although there is no 
single agreed upon approach for studying integration, many researchers have used the 
movements in asset prices (for example, interest rates) to assess capital market 
integration, in part because these data are often available for longer periods of time and 
for a variety of locations. Economic theory suggests that asset prices ought to obey the 
law of one price because if capital markets are perfectly competitive and no market 
frictions exist, arbitrage opportunities should not persist across time and space. Otherwise 
the arbitrage opportunities could be exploited by market participants. Much of the 
existing literature on capital market integration has thus analyzed the extent to which 
actual capital markets meet the idealized criteria of frictionless, perfectly competitive 
markets. For example, studies on the process of national capital market formation in the 
United States have emphasized a variety of regulatory and institutional characteristics 
that may have impeded the development of a national capital market in the nineteenth 
century.
6  
                                                 
6 For the development of the commercial paper market, see Davis (1965) and Smiley (1975); for the stock 
market’s role see Sushka and Barrett (1984); for legal restrictions and banking market structure see Sylla 
(1969) and James (1976a, 1976b); for bank failures see Rockoff  (1977); and for differential risk and 
transportation and information costs, see Stigler (1967), Eichengreen (1984), Snowden (1987), and 
Bodenhorn (1995). For a more extensive review of the literature on the U.S., see Bodenhorn and Rockoff 
(1992).   4
In this light, we begin our analysis of Japan’s market for loanable funds by 
presenting evidence of the convergence in interest rates across Japanese prefectures. 
Figure 1 plots the coefficient of variation, on a quarterly basis, for the 47 Japanese 
prefectures from the mid-1880s to the early 1920s.
7 The graph suggests that interest rate 
differentials were narrowing over this period. By the middle of the 1890s, the Ministry of 
Finance’s annual report on banking stopped commenting on regional gaps in interest 
rates, and suggested that capital market integration had taken place: “interest-rate trends 
in different regions are virtually the same.”
 8 In the rest of this section, we suggest several 
hypotheses that might help account for the apparent convergence in lending rates, which 
we then test in the next section of the paper. The experience of the U.S. provides some 
guidance on what hypotheses we consider; however, the pattern and pace of convergence 
among Japanese prefectures is sufficiently different from what U.S. regions experienced 
at that time that we cast our net more broadly in order to consider additional factors. That 
is, although there are some surface level similarities between the development of the U.S. 
banking system and Japan’s in the late nineteenth century, the Meiji period in Japanese 
history (1868-1913) ushered in a variety of institutional innovations in banking that may 
have figured prominently in the development of a national market for loanable funds.  
 
A. Competition in the Loanable Funds Market & Financial Innovation 
 
  All else equal, more competitive banking systems ought to exhibit lower rates on 
borrowing and greater loan volume than monopolistic banking systems. One explanation, 
then, for the persistence of high lending rates in some regions is that banks were able to 
take advantage of market power, and charged local customers higher prices. They 
effectively exploited their locational advantage to derive monopoly rents.  
  In underdeveloped markets, banks are often able to retain significant pricing 
power. Distance from a central financial market therefore can often act as a barrier to 
entry by making it more costly for a larger, out-of-area bank to establish a branch or 
purchase an existing bank. For example, the Ministry of Finance reported in 1889 that 
                                                 
7 See Mitchener and Ohnuki (2007) for a time-series analysis of the convergence in rates during this period. 
8 “21
st Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” (1896), p. 29.    5
“interest rates are always lower in the urban areas where there are highly developed 
financial institutions and higher in outlying areas that lack these institutions; this is a 
generally accepted economic principle.”
9  Hence, the threat of entry may have been 
weaker in markets located further from financial centers like Tokyo and Osaka, a 
hypothesis we consider in the next section of the paper. Banks may have also been able to 
exploit informational advantages to obtain pricing power. For example, before the 
telegraph was widely used, it may have been difficult for customers to have complete 
information about competitive lending rates.  
  Another potential explanation for local market power is the role of regulation, 
which we will test by examining the competitive environment for banks in a given 
prefecture. Scholars examining the United States have noted that high initial capital 
requirements, restrictions on branch banking, and limitations on bank mergers or on the 
chartering of new banks may have impeded competition in regional banking markets. 
These regulations may have fostered local geographic monopolies and impeded the 
development of a national banking market in the U.S. (James, 1976a, 1976b; Sylla, 
1969).  
  Circumstantial evidence might suggest a similar environment in Japan. After all, 
shortly after the Meiji restoration, the Japanese government passed a law in 1872 
authorizing the creation of national banks that were closely modeled on the United States 
national banking system (which had been created in 1863). But, the Japanese experiment 
with national banks was much smaller in scale than in the U.S. The Japanese national 
banking system grew more slowly than the U.S. system, it had fewer relationships with 
other banks in the economy, and it was abandoned soon after its creation (in 1885) in 
favor of other types of banking institutions (Miyajima and Weber, 2001). Summary 
statistics on the Japanese banking system confirm the view that national banks were not 
an important source of banking growth during the Meiji-Taisho period. As Figure 2 
shows, the growth in savings banks, ordinary banks, and other commercial banking 
institutions was quantitatively more important than national banks for our sample period. 
                                                 
9 “12
th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” (1889), p. 61. As examples, 
interest rates in commercial areas like Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and Kanagawa were the lowest in the country.    6
The regulatory legacy of this Japanese national banking system also turned out to 
be quite limited. As in the U.S. in the nineteenth century, the original authorizing 
legislation in Japan established minimum capital requirements for national banks in 
Japan. These requirements specified the capital that banks were required to have on hand 
in order to receive a charter from the Ministry of Finance Shiheino-kami (Chief Officer 
of the Paper Currency Bureau). In particular, banks in large cities (greater than 100,000 
in population) needed more than 500,000 yen (roughly $453,000 at 1880 exchange rates) 
to receive a charter.
10 Banks in medium-sized cities (between 10,000 and 100,000 people) 
needed a minimum of 200,000 yen. However, banks in small cities (between 3,000 and 
10,000 people) could receive the approval of the Ministry of Finance to operate even if 
they had less than 50,000 yen in charter capital, so it is likely that capital requirements 
were not binding in smaller towns and cities. The original law was then amended in 1876, 
significantly lowering the capital requirements for national banks. The amended act 
basically required that national banks were required to have capital of more than 100,000 
yen; national banks in larger cities (with a population greater than 100,000) were required 
to have 200,000 yen in minimum charter capital. However, these requirements were still 
not restrictive, since banks with capital between 50,000 and 100,000 yen could operate 
given the approval of the Ministry of Finance.  
Since the Ministry of Finance wanted better control of bank note issuance, it 
stopped chartering national banks in 1878 and redirected its attention to establishing other 
types of commercial banks without note issuing privileges. The Bank Act of 1890, which 
was created to regulate these non-national, commercial banks, established minimum 
capital requirements similar to those in the National Bank Act.
11  It did require non-
national banks to get charter approval from the Ministry of Finance, but this restriction 
does not appear to have limited the growth of these banks. The number of the non-
national commercial banks grew rapidly, with their numbers quickly exceeding those of 
the national banking system at its peak (Figure 2). By the 1880s, the capital requirements 
                                                 
10 The yen was introduced in 1867 and was initially set at par with the dollar. In the 1880s, the exchange 
rate fluctuated between 1.1 to 1.3 yen per dollar (Global Financial Data, www.globalfinancialdata.com). As 
an alternative benchmark for understanding these capital requirements, the average capital of all firms 
(including those in the manufacturing sector) in 1896 (the earliest year for which there are data) was 87,386 
yen (Nihon Tokei Kyokai, 1987). 
11 The act was put into effect in 1893.   7
were quantitatively unimportant for commercial banks and did not serve as a meaningful 
barrier to entry (Tamaki, 1994; Goto, 1973). In an attempt to stabilize the banking system 
after a financial crisis in 1901, the Ministry of Finance began to encourage mergers and 
consolidation in the banking industry and raised the minimum charter capital 
requirements for new banks to 500,000 yen.
12  Although the higher minimum capital 
requirement and the Ministry’s policy slowed growth of the banking system (Figure 2), 
the number of banks had already expanded by nearly tenfold in sixteen years (from 477 
to 4141). Historians have concluded that entry regulations were fairly lax through the 
beginning of the twentieth century (Okazaki and Sawada 2006).  
The Meiji-Taisho period was relatively unfettered in terms of entry regulations, 
with relatively free banking. Moreover, in contrast to the U.S. banking system of the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, branch banking flourished in Japan, since 
governments (either national or prefectural) imposed no restrictions on the formation of 
branching networks.  Okada (2001) suggests that inter-bank transactions in the early 
Meiji Period and the development of the branch bank system were important in the 
development of a national capital market in the middle and late Meiji periods.
13 From 
1884 to 1925, the number of branches jumped from 122 to 6287 and the number of 
branches per head office increased from 0.87 to 3.77 in order to service an expanding 
customer base and the growing Japanese economy. Okazaki (2002) suggests that the 
development of branching in Japan spurred competition in the banking sector, and that 
growth in branching was especially strong after 1905. Asai (1978) also suggests that 
branching led to competition in lending rates and deposits. Figure 3 shows the overall 
growth in branching, which was not uniform across Japan. From 1884 to 1925, Tokyo 
and Hyogo saw the greatest increase in branch offices – from 16 to 487 and 5 to 398, 
respectively. On the other hand, Miyazaki and Okinawa saw branching expand the least 
over the same period – from 1 to 53 and 2 to 8, respectively. Some research also suggests 
that competition from branching may have been largely confined to major cities.
14 When 
we analyze the process of capital market integration in the next section of the paper, we 
                                                 
12 See Okazaki and Sawada (2006). 
13 For research into the significance of the development of the branch bank system, see Asai (1978). 
14 Nikkei Kin’yu Shinbunsha and Chihou Kinyushi Kenkyukai (2003, pp.368-9).    8
will therefore have to take into account differences in commercial branch banking across 
prefectures. 
Commercial banks also extended their correspondent relationships during this 
period, and used their networks to transfer funds across regions.
15  Looking at the 
domestic funds transfer market in more detail, we find that, between 1877 and 1880, 
branch office networks and correspondent networks were built between the major urban 
banks and the large regional banks, and these networks were used to provide funds 
transfer services.
16
 In Tokyo, Osaka and other centers, transfer clearinghouses arose 
spontaneously by 1880, and served as a venue for trading transfers between banks.
17 
However, because Tokyo-Osaka transfers were the focus of the correspondent network 
and only a few of the largest regional banks were able to participate in the network at all, 
it may not have mattered much. 
In short, the lack of restrictions on entry and the innovations in Japanese banking 
during the Meiji period suggest that the banking system may have been more competitive 
than the U.S. banking system, at least through the end of the nineteenth century. In 
Section III, we test how differences in competition in the loanable funds market at the 
prefectural level may have influenced interest rate differentials.  
 
B. Information Networks 
 
  Another factor that we wish to test in our statistical analysis is the role of 
information networks. As Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin (1999) have noted 
informational barriers can impede financial market integration as well, like a lack of 
competition. Technological improvements that lower the cost of gathering information 
can increase the quantity of financial services and lower their prices. Improved 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, detailed prefectural data are not available on commercial bank correspondent networks, so 
we are not able to include this variable in our econometric model. 
16 See Tsurumi (1991, pp. 117-118).  
17 Little is known about transfer clearinghouses because of the paucity of documents remaining, but it is 
assumed that the Osaka transfer clearinghouse provided “trading in Tokyo transfers” and “inter-bank funds 
lending/borrowing” (see Tsurumi, 1991, pp. 130-143). Tsurumi (1991) focuses on the fact that domestic 
transfers were “traded” rather than “exchanged” to hypothesize that while the offsetting of transfers was the 
primary function of transfer clearinghouses, they also served as a means of investing short-term surpluses 
(see Tsurumi, 1991, p. 135).    9
information networks also let financial institutions gather better quality information on 
regional tastes and differences in risk. With lower-cost access to information, bank 
customers can also more easily gather information about market conditions that prevail 
elsewhere, allowing them to seek out competitive rates.  
  The Meiji period witnessed a dramatic improvement in transportation and 
communication networks beginning in the 1870s when the telegraph, railroads, and a 
modern postal system were established. Fujii (1998) suggests that the growth in these 
networks was important for economic development; it seems plausible that the 
development of information networks in Japan may therefore have influenced the market 
for loanable funds, particularly because the expansion in communication networks was 
uneven. Teranishi (1982) suggests that better transportation and communications 
networks enhanced the development of private correspondent networks among banks. 
Sugiyama (1990) also suggests that these developments may have been important in 
driving the integration in commodity and goods markets within Japan. For example, 
although use of the telegraph began in 1870 in Tokyo and Osaka, the process of 
developing the network to cover a broader geographical area took 10-15 years (Ishii, 
1994). According to Fujii (1990) and Sugiyama (1990), that two-thirds of the private 
usage of the telegraph involved the transfer of information for business activities, such as 
commodity prices or interest rates; in 1885, the number of telegraph offices per capita 
varied considerably from prefecture to prefecture (Figure 4). We include a measure of the 
use of telegraphs at the prefectural level in our analysis to assess whether the diffusion of 
this information network contributed to the reduction of interest rate differentials. 
One final advantage of branch-banking networks is that they may have allowed 
banks to price loans more efficiently. Branch banking networks enable head offices to 
obtain more detailed information on local economic conditions and local borrowers; as a 
result, they may be willing to extend loans over a wider geographical area (Carlson and 
Mitchener, 2007). Although costly for banks to build, it may enable them to also obtain 
more customers as well as to diversify away from idiosyncratic risk associated with local 
lending markets. The comparative advantage that branching networks have in gathering 
specific information about borrowers and their investment projects may have also 
hastened the development of formalized lending markets in Japan by making it more   10
difficult for informal money lenders to compete with banks, which had greater economies 
of scope and scale.  
 
C. Bank of Japan 
 
  One final institutional change may have fostered the development of a national 
capital market – the Japanese government’s creation of a central bank (modeled after the 
Bank of Belgium). The early founding date of the Bank of Japan (1882), in comparison to 
the establishment of the U.S. Federal Reserve System in 1913, may have facilitated inter-
regional payments and alleviated existing regional biases in the funding of loans during 
our sample period.  
Promoting the nationwide integration of financial markets was one of the Bank of 
Japan’s goals.
18  According to the “Proposal to Establish the Bank of Japan” and a 
supporting document entitled, “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan,”
19 
the Bank was founded with five objectives in mind: (1) facilitate finance; (2) enhance 
funding of the national banks; (3) reduce of interest rates; (4) offer treasury receipt and 
disbursement services; and (5) discount of foreign bills. Of these goals, the first three 
sought to improve domestic financial intermediation functions, and the first is particularly 
relevant to our discussion of the Bank of Japan’s network. According to the “Explanation 
of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan,” the first goal, “facilitate finance,” was based 
on a judgment that networks of private-sector financial institutions were insufficient to 
adjust funding surpluses and shortfalls between regions.
20 It was therefore suggested that 
the central bank sign correspondent contracts with national banks throughout the country 
                                                 
18 Matsukata, Masayoshi, “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan”, Bank of Japan, 
Research Department (1958a, pp. 991-1007).  
19 Submitted to Prime Minister Sanjo, requesting “a speedy decision on the proposal to establish the Bank 
of Japan and promulgation of the ordinance.” (See Bank of Japan, Research Department (1958a, p. 990); 
Bank of Japan (1982, p. 120.)  
20 The “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan” says, “Regarding the present status of 
national banks, they stand in geographical confrontation to one another and have little desire to 
communicate or coordinate. Indeed, they move in opposition to one another and check one another. Should 
one bank have a surplus, it is not able to use that surplus to cover shortfalls in another bank.” (See Bank of 
Japan, Research Department (1958a, p. 993.)    11
so that it could unify local financial markets into a single, nationwide market.
21 The use 
of correspondent transactions to build a network between the Bank of Japan and private-
sector financial institutions was considered to be a powerful tool for the achievement of 
the initial objectives behind the Bank’s establishment.  
According to Tsurumi (1991), “spontaneous private financial markets” had 
existed prior to the establishment of the Bank of Japan, but domestic Japanese financial 
markets were not sufficiently tied together: the Bank of Japan transformed these 
“spontaneous private financial markets” into a single market with the Bank of Japan at its 
core.
22 Private-sector banks that signed correspondent transactions could use the Bank of 
Japan to transfer funds and collect bills from remote locations, and they could borrow 
short-term from the BOJ provided that they put up collateral.
23 The Bank of Japan began 
to sign correspondent transactions with private-sector banks in June 1883, opening up a 
means of transferring funds through the Bank of Japan in addition to private payment 
systems. The number of correspondent contracts grew considerably after the BOJ signed 
its first correspondent contracts in 1883, reaching around 150 in 1890, and peaking at 
                                                 
21 The “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan” says, “The establishment of a central bank 
at this time would enable the sound national banks in various regions to be treated as Bank of Japan’s 
branch offices, with ‘correspondence’ contracts signed so as to open the first nationwide channels for the 
circulation of money... A central bank would play a key role in providing financial channels, observing the 
degree of activity of nationwide commerce and money transfers so that money surplus in one region could 
be transferred to the financial needs of another region, and the money surplus of that region could be lent 
for the financial needs of the first region. This movement and circulation would be akin to the heart 
pumping blood through the arteries to the limbs to enable them to move. Doing this would, for the first 
time, enable the volume of money to be smoothed out so that the national finances would no longer suffer 
from clogging and blockage.” (See Bank of Japan, Research Department (1958a, p. 994.)  
22 As discussed in the previous section, although correspondent networks existed in Japan prior to the 
founding of the BOJ, these were limited in scope and function in comparison to the clearinghouses that 
existed in the United States (Bodenhorn, 2003; James and Weiman, 2005). The slower development of 
clearinghouse arrangements in Japan resulted from an initially underdeveloped banking system at the start 
of our sample period (there were few private banks prior to the Meiji restoration) and product and labor 
markets that were still integrating during the 1870s, which blunted the need for interregional movements of 
capital. Tsurumi (1991) says, “The Bank of Japan...served as the nationwide monetary regulator and 
therefore established a broad domestic correspondent transaction network. The Bank of Japan’s domestic 
funds transfer transactions were unique because of its position as a central bank. The domestic funds 
transfer market expanded and changed rapidly after the opening of the Bank, and the Bank came to serve 
literally as its backbone. The funds transfer clearinghouses in the three major cities had emerged as 
spontaneous organizations to provide adjustments on the back of the rapid expansion of domestic funds 
transfer transactions, but they were replaced by Bank of Japan correspondent transactions.” (p. 152)  
23 Correspondent contracts were signed on a branch-office basis, not on a financial institution basis. For 
example, in 1883 the Mitsui Bank had seven branch offices in Hachioji, Odawara, Nagoya, Aomori and 
other locations that signed contracts with the Bank of Japan head office, while its Otsu office signed a 
contract with the Bank of Japan Osaka Branch. In other words, at this point in time, the Mitsui Bank had 
eight correspondent contracts with the Bank of Japan (1982, p. 329).    12
over 200 in 1900 (Figure 5).
24 Kasuya (2000) comments that “going through the Bank of 
Japan helped to smooth out the movement of funds between remote locations.”
25
 On the 
other hand, the rising volume of correspondent transactions handled by the Bank of Japan 
had the effect of reducing the volume handled by private-sector transfer clearinghouses. 
According to Tsurumi (1991, p.136), the BOJ eventually completely took over this 
business by around 1890.  
The branch offices of the Bank of Japan were supposed to “facilitate finance.” 
The Osaka Branch was established in December 1882, opening almost simultaneous to 
the head office in Tokyo, because of Osaka’s position as a “center of commerce.” No 
other branches were established immediately thereafter, however.
26 At the time of the 
Bank’s establishment, the Ministry of Finance was concerned that “the establishment of 
local Bank of Japan offices may ‘impair the operations of local ordinary banks,’ and the 
Bank of Japan should therefore ‘initially’ sign correspondent contracts rather than 
establishing branch offices.”
27
 This was presumably why the Bank of Japan began by 
developing a nationwide correspondent network as a channel for circulating funds and 
delayed its expansion of a branching network.
28
 The Ministry of Finance’s policy appears 
to have changed its position, however, in the latter half of the 1880s. On July 30, 1889, 
seven years after the drafting of “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan” 
by Masayoshi Matsukata, a Ministry of Finance memorandum acknowledged the need to 
expand the Bank of Japan’s branching network. According to the memorandum, the 
primary duty of the Bank of Japan was “to provide a means of funds transfers throughout 
                                                 
24 The importance of correspondent relationships between the Bank of Japan and commercial banks 
declined after 1900, as shown in the Figure 5. After this date, commercial banks once again resumed an 
important role in establishing correspondent networks (Kamiyama, 2000 pp.102-104). 
25 Kasuya (2000, p. 136).  
26 On October 20, 1882, Vice Governor Tetsunosuke Tomita, acting on behalf of the governor of the Bank 
of Japan, submitted an “Application to Establish an Osaka Branch” to Minister of Finance Masayoshi 
Matsukata (Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Document A3681). His 
reasons for needing a branch office in Osaka were: “Osaka is the center of commerce and a major channel 
for finance in western Japan as Tokyo is in eastern Japan. Maintaining close contact with it is a key point in 
the operations of the Bank, and it is considered urgent that the Bank of Japan establish a branch office 
there.” This application was approved on October 23.  
27 Tsurumi (1991, p. 96). “Bank of Japan Ordinance” (Bill No. 330) first reading; see “Minutes of the 
Upper House” Volume 12, p. 526.  
28 “The Bank of Japan did not have a branch office network where there was fear of encroaching upon the 
base of operations for national banks. Instead, it signed correspondent contracts with powerful local banks, 
enabling it to overcome the isolation of the national banks and achieve nationwide control.” (Tsurumi, 
1991, p. 114)    13
the country and to facilitate market finance.”
 29  This emphasis on promoting funds 
transfers
30 was more or less the same as Masayoshi Matsukata had argued for in the 
“Proposal to Establish the Bank of Japan,” but the Ministry of Finance placed additional 
emphasis on the need to establish branch offices and agencies in order to achieve these 
objectives.
31 
According to documents in the Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies Archives, Bank of Japan Governor Shigetoshi Yoshihara applied to 
Minister of Finance Masayoshi Matsukata to establish new branches on June 16, 1886.
32 
The application begins by noting the need to closely monitor conditions in local areas: 
“There has been a significant increase in the Bank’s operations with respect to its duties 
of handling treasury receipts and disbursements, issuing convertible banknotes and 
providing ‘correspondence’ services, and these services now extend throughout the 
country. We therefore believe it is necessary and urgent to more closely monitor local 
conditions and circumstances.” Governor Yoshihara went on to note that the BOJ, in its 
present configuration, had little scope for carrying out these aims. “The Bank only has 
one branch office in Osaka and engages in ‘correspondence’ financial transactions with 
national and private banks in other parts of the country and must rely on their 
communications through correspondent transactions to confirm the ebbs and flows of 
local commerce and finance to report to the Bank of Japan’s head office.” Governor 
Yoshihara thus viewed the Bank of Japan’s correspondent transactions with private-
                                                 
29 Shigeyoshi Matsuo papers. (Writer unknown. Uses Ministry of Finance stationery). The document 
explains the functions of the Yokohama Specie Bank and Bank of Japan and is entitled “Proposal for the 
Bank of Japan to Use the Specie Bank as a Liable Agency to Perform Foreign Exchange Services” (Bank 
of Japan, Research Department, 1958a, pp. 1441-1453).  
30 Below are the other duties  it lists: “Rediscounting and purchasing of commercial bills and promissory 
notes so as to enhance the funding of banks, etc.,” “regulating the ebbs and flows of finance and 
maintaining converged  interest rates,” “discounting foreign funds transfer bills so as to enhance the 
convenience of domestic and foreign trade” and “planning the recovery of specie.”  
31 At the bottom of the page on “providing a means of funds transfers throughout the country and 
facilitating market finance,” the Ministry of Finance notes, “The Bank of Japan is the central bank of Japan 
and at the center of monetary circulation in the Japanese financial economy. It should open a series of 
branch offices and agencies around the country so as to communicate and coordinate with financial 
companies around the country, providing a significant means of funds transfers so as to alleviate the 
congestion and clogging in finance by averaging the relative demand for money, for example, allowing 
money surplus in one region to be transferred to serve the financial needs of another region, and  a money 
surplus in that region to be lent for the financial needs of the first region. 
32 “Application to the Minister of Finance to Increase Branches” (Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies Archives, Document A3681).    14
sector financial institutions as inadequate to respond to changes in local financial and 
economic circumstances, and he therefore argued for the establishment of “branch offices 
in local centers” that would “facilitate finance and balance interest rates.”
33 Seven days 
after the application was made, the Minister of Finance, Masayoshi Matsukata, approved 
it.  
Table 1 traces the establishment of branch and liaison offices between 1882 and 
1909. In contrast to the U.S. Federal Reserve System, the BOJ’s branches were instead 
rolled out during the extended period of our sample.
34  The regional variation in the 
establishment of BOJ branches is particularly useful for testing whether they had any 
impact on reducing interest-rate differentials. For the first decade after its establishment, 
the Bank of Japan had only two branch offices, in Tokyo and Osaka, but by 1910, it had 
10 offices in nine prefectures (Figure 6). The first two liaison offices were in Gifu and 
Wakayama in 1891; three more were established in Hokkaido in 1893.
35 The second 
branch office to be established after Osaka was the Saibu (Kyushu) Branch, in 1893. 
Branch and liaison offices were established at a steady pace thereafter.
36 In 1909, there 
were branch and liaison offices in most of the major financial centers of Japan and in 
Hokkaido: Osaka (1882), Saibu, Sapporo, Hakodate, Nemuro (1893), Kyoto (1894), 
                                                 
33 When the Bank of Japan was established, Masayoshi Matsukata commented in “Explanation of the 
Establishment of the Bank of Japan” on both the alleviation of regional disparities in interest rates and the 
alleviation of seasonal fluctuations, but there is no clear reference to “balancing interest rates.” Other 
important purposes for branch offices were funds payments and settlement, treasury receipts and 
disbursements, and banknote issuance.  
34 The first application was made on April 19, 1886, but due to inadequate content (lack of branch bylaws) 
the Bank of Japan reapplied on June 16. The draft application of April 19 (the actual application is not in 
the Bank of Japan archives, only the draft) lists eight centers for the establishment of branch offices: 
Nagasaki, Hakodate, Niigata, Kobe, Yokohama, Akamagaseki (now Shimonoseki), Nagoya and Sendai. 
The application notes that they “will not be established all at the same time” but does not comment 
specifically on the order of establishment. The application of June 16 (which remains in the Bank of Japan 
archives) contains Masayoshi Matsukata’s signature and a note that says, “Quickly investigate the locations 
of branch offices and their operational bylaws and re-apply.”  
35 These liaison offices were established as an emergency measure because the Mitsui Bank, which had 
served as the local treasury agent, resigned that position. The liaison offices were closed after a short period 
of time.  
36 The speech given by Bank of Japan a board member Morito Yokura at the opening of the Saibu Branch 
remains in the Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives (“Speech at the 
Opening of the Saibu Branch” Document A3681). He says, “... the Bank... has a responsibility to facilitate 
the finance around Japan and enhance the convenience of private enterprise,” but in spite of this, “the 
circumstances were not right and the times were not ripe” for the establishment of branch offices after the 
opening of the Osaka Branch, but “we have begun to reform the Bank’s organization and reorganize its 
operations so that branches can gradually be established around the country.”    15
Nagoya, Otaru (1897), Fukushima (1899), Hiroshima (1905), and Kanazawa (1909).
37 
For capital market integration, the key is whether branch and liaison offices provided 
funds transfer services. Documentary evidence collected from the “Manuals and Rules of 
the Bank of Japan’s Operations,” (Collection 1 Volume 1), demonstrates that they did, 
from the moment they were established, along with the other services they provided, such 




III. Empirical Assessment of Market Integration 
 
A. Data and Estimation 
 
Our aim is to characterize the process of long-run integration and understand the 
factors that are leading to or inhibiting capital market integration. We do so by estimating 
the relative importance for market integration of institutions, competition, geography, and 
prefecture-specific factors by estimating: 
 
(1) RATEit =   β0 + β1BNKFAILit +  β2RICELANDPit + β3CROPFIELDPit + β4RESIDPit 
+ β5AVGLOANit + β6TELEGRAPHit + β7DISTANCEi + β8BRANCHit + 
β9BOJOFFICEit + β10BOJCORRit + β11BNKMERGERit + β12BNKLQDit  
+ β13BNKENTRYit  + εit.   
 
To relate the process of financial market integration to the law of one price, we consider 
each prefecture’s interest rate relative to a benchmark rate, so that the dependent variable 
                                                 
37 When local banks requested the establishment of a Bank of Japan branch or liaison office, it was 
common for them to emphasize the facilitation of funds transfers with other regions. A slightly later 
example comes from the application for the establishment of a branch in Asahikawa, Hokkaido filed on 
November 22, 1921 and submitted to Governor Junnosuke Inoue as a resolution of the 21
st Hokkaido 
Bankers Conference. The application says that the establishment of a Bank of Japan branch office in 
Asahikawa would “contribute to the steady growth of Hokkaido, the development and progress of industry 
and in particular the development of modern funds transfers...it is most urgent for funds transfers to be 
facilitated so as to promote the development of industry.” (Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies Archives, Document A3682).  
38 This collection describes the operations of the Osaka Branch (opened 1882), the Gifu Liaison Office, and 
the Wakayama Liaison Office (opened 1891). See Ohnuki (2007) for more details on the different types of 
BOJ offices.   16
RATEit is defined as the difference between the annual average lending rate in prefecture 
i and year t and the average across all prefectures in year t. In order to test whether our 
results our sensitive to this definition, we also consider two other ways of defining the 
depending variable – the prefecture’s interest rate minus the rate in either Tokyo or Osaka 
– the two financial centers of Japan during our sample period.
39 
The independent variables are defined as: 
•  BNKFAILit is the percentage of existing banks (at time t-1) that failed in 
prefecture i at time t;  
•  RICELANDPit is the log price (measured in tan) of land dedicated to rice 
production in prefecture i at time t; 
•  CROPFIELDit is the log price (measured in tan) of agricultural crops other than 
rice in prefecture i at time t;  
•  RESIDPit is the log price (measured in tan) of residential land (outside of city 
centers) in prefecture i at time t;  
•  AVGLOANit is the (log) value of loans of all commercial banks divided by the 
number of commercial banks in prefecture i at time t; 
•  TELEGRAPHit  is the number of domestic telegraph transmissions per capita in 
prefecture i at time t; 
•  DISTANCEi is the distance between the capital city in prefecture i and either 
Osaka or Tokyo (whichever is closest); 
•  BRANCHit is bank branches divided by total head offices in prefecture i at time t; 
•  BOJOFFICEit denotes the number of branch offices established by Bank of Japan 
in prefecture i at time t; 
•  BOJCORRit is the number of correspondent relationships with commercial banks 
that the Bank of Japan had in prefecture i at time t; 
•  BNKMERGERit is the percentage of existing banks at t-1 that merged at time t in 
prefecture i; 
•  BNKLQDit is the percentage of existing banks at t-1 that voluntarily liquidated at 
time t in prefecture i; 
•  BNKENTRY it is the number of banks that entered prefecture i at time t as a 
percentage of existing banks at t-1; 
•  β are estimated coefficients; 
•  and ε is a white noise error term capturing other influences on lending rates.  
 
                                                 
39 We examined the stationarity of the dependent variable in order to avoid spurious regression results. 
Levin and Lin and Im, Pesarin, and Shin panel unit root tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (either 
a common unit root process or individual unit root process) at the 1% or 5% level for all three definitions of 
the dependent variable. We also considered ADF tests, where the number of lags used in the test was 
determined by the AIC criteria. More details are available upon request from the authors. For the most of 
the individual prefectures, we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for most prefectures once the 
series are differenced relative to Osaka, Tokyo, or the mean. Results are available from the authors upon 
request.   17
  The dependent variable, RATEit, is constructed using annual lending rates, 
collected from the Ministry of Finance’s Ginkokyoku Nempo.
40 According to Asakura 
(1961), the type of loans reported in this publication were often taken out by farmers with 
business interests in sericulture, silk reeling, tea, and rice, and who used the loans to 
cover the cost of variable inputs into production (such as seeds and fertilizer), capital 
equipment (farm machinery), land, tax payments, and living expenses.
41 To create the 
variable RATEit, we first averaged monthly high and low values, and then averaged these 
monthly values over the 12 months of year t.
42  
We gathered data from a variety of sources to construct information on regional 
banking markets (loan volume and loan size) as well as characteristics of bank market 
competition (bank branches, mergers, voluntary liquidations, and bank entry). Data on 
the numbers of commercial banks, number of branches of commercial banks, loans, 
capital, and deposits in each prefecture came from the Annual Report of the Banking 
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (Ginko kyoku Nempo),” Imperial Statistics (Teikoku 
Tokei Nenkan), Japanese Monetary Statistics (Nihon no Kinyu Tokei), Goto (1973), and 
Banker’s Directory (Ginko Soran). Our sample of commercial banks included kokuritsu 
ginko (“national banks”), shiritsu ginko (“private banks”), and chochiku ginko (“savings 
banks”). All three types of banks made loans, although they differed somewhat in the size 
of loans they offered to customers. Kokuritsu ginko also had note issuing privileges until 
1883, at which point these were revoked by the government. Beginning in the 1890s, 
kokuritsu ginko and shiritsu ginko were converted to futsu ginko (“ordinary banks”). We 
computed data on bank entry, mergers, and voluntary liquidations for each prefecture 
using information contained in from Hompo Ginko Hensenshi (the Tokyo Bankers 
Association, 1998).  
                                                 
40 The interest rates are described in further detail in Mitchener and Ohnuki (2007). 
41  During our sample period, the tax applied to farmers was a land tax, and was payable even in the event 
of a bad harvest.  
42 There may have been some seasonality in money demand, which in turn affected regional interest rates. 
For example, the demand for money may have been strong in the autumn due to the rice harvest and in the 
spring, summer, and autumn due to the sericulture industry. Although Finance Minister Matsukata 
mentioned seasonality in the “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan,” it does not appear to 
have been a major reason for the founding. Moreover, when we regressed each prefecture’s interest rate on 
monthly dummy variables, all the dummies were statistically insignificant at conventional levels of 
significance. We found no evidence of seasonality when we instead used quarterly dummies. Correlograms 
of each prefecture also showed no evidence of seasonal patterns.    18
For our institutional variables, the source for the number of correspondent 
relationships between the Bank of Japan and commercial banks was the “Manuals and 
Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations” in Enkaku-shi, Collection 1, Volume 2 and 
Collection 2, Volume 3. The number of Bank of Japan offices in each prefecture came 
from The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years.  
Equation 1 also includes measures for the size of informational networks. Data on 
the number of telegraph transmissions are from Imperial Statistics and Teishinsho 
Nempo. We computed the distance between the capital city of a prefecture and either 
Osaka or Tokyo using information on road transportation networks that existed at that 
time, using http///www.mapfan.com/routemap/routeset.cgi. In regressions where RATE is 
defined relative to the mean across prefectures, we use either Tokyo or Osaka, whichever 
is closest. When RATE is defined relative to Osaka or Tokyo, we use the distance 
measure with respect to Osaka or Tokyo, respectively. 
 We included two additional covariates to control for differences in default risk 
across prefectures. The first measure of risk that we compute is differences in land prices 
across prefectures. If land is a form of borrower’s collateral, then all else equal, higher 
land prices ought to be associated with lower default risk. Given the historical importance 
of rice in the Japanese economy and the substantial amount of land dedicated to rice 
cultivation, we constructed a time series for the price of land dedicated to its production. 
However, because not all borrowers were rice farmers or owned fields dedicated to rice 
production, we also constructed two other land price series: one for other types of 
agricultural crops and one for residential land prices. Data for all three series are taken 
from Shuzeikyoku Tokei Nemposho and Imperial Statistics.  Although land prices have 
been used to proxy risk in other studies (Eichengreen, 1984) the association between 
default risk (for borrowers) and land prices in Japan may be more tenuous in the Japanese 
case. A borrowers’ personal credit history was the most important determinant of lending, 
and the most common form of collateral was government bonds. Some evidence from the 
case of Mitsui Bank (Mitsui Bunko, 1980) suggests that land was the last form of 
collateral that banks were willing to accept, so it is not clear, a priori, how important the 
land proxies are in the Japanese case.    19
Given the limitations of land prices, we constructed a second measure of risk 
based on commercial bank failures. The source of the data was Hompo Ginko Hensenshi 
(the Tokyo Bankers Association, 1998), which included information about commercial 
bank entry and exit during our sample period. We adjust the bank failure series using 
population figures from Imperial Statistics. Other things being equal, prefectures with 
more bank failures per capita might have had greater underlying risks in lending.  
 
B. Empirical Results from Panel Models 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical 
analysis. Our sample covers all 47 prefectures and the years 1884 to 1925. We chose to 
end our study at this date since there were substantial banking reforms that began in 1926 
and gained momentum after the severe Showa Financial Crisis of 1927.
43 Most of our 
specifications use fixed-effects panel models since there are likely unobserved 
differences across prefectures that may influence interest-rate behavior. In these, the 
distance measure (which remains constant over our sample period) is dropped from the 
reported regressions. Since Figure 1 suggests that there is a clear downward trend in rates 
over our sample period, we include year dummies in the regressions. Robust standard 
errors are reported to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
Column 1 of Table 3 reports results from an OLS specification where we subtract 
the mean rate for all prefectures from each individual prefecture’s rate. The R-squared 
suggests that our model accounts for roughly 31% of the prefectural variation in interest-
rate deviations from the mean rate across all prefectures. Moreover, the statistically and 
economically significant coefficients reported in Table 3 suggest that there are several 
factors that may likely helped integrate the capital market during our sample period. 
When we include fixed effects at the prefectural level (column 2), the evidence for these 
factors is still there.  
Specifically, prefectures with above average commercial branch banking and 
telegraph usage as well as BOJ branches converged more quickly. The build out of 
                                                 
43 Given the significant shakeout in the banking industry and the regulatory reforms that occurred (Okazaki 
and Sawada, 2006), it is likely the case that rates thereafter evolve for reasons altogether different from the 
earlier period.    20
information networks during our sample period appears to have helped a national capital 
market emerge. As shown in column 2, the diffusion of information helped to link 
regional lending markets. A one-standard-deviation increase in the volume of telegraph 
transfers per person lowered a prefecture’s lending rate by roughly 17 basis points (using 
the standard deviation shown in Table 2). In addition to facilitating the development of 
correspondent networks the telegraph, as we noted above, conveyed information to banks 
and borrowers about rates prevailing in other parts of the country thereby driving rates 
down in more distant markets.
44  
Financial innovation also played a role in the convergence of interest rates; in 
particular, the dissemination of branch offices appears to have lowered rates for 
borrowers. The coefficient shown in column 2 suggests that a one-standard deviation 
increase in the ratio of branch offices to head offices decreased lending rates by around 
eight basis points. As we suggested earlier, there are several channels through which 
branch banking may have accelerated convergence, by introducing more competition, by 
facilitating the spread of information on local economic conditions, and by helping banks 
allocate capital more efficiently. To provide a more direct test of the first channel, we 
interacted our branching variable with merger rates, voluntary liquidations, and bank 
entry rates to examine whether branching reduced lending by introducing more 
competition into local markets. The interactions were not statistically significant and the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the branching variable itself does not change 
(results not reported). It thus appears that a more likely explanation for the impact of 
branching on lending rates was that it encouraged the spread of transparent information 
and improved the efficiency of the lending market. 
One of the more interesting empirical findings relates to the unique role the Bank 
of Japan played in forging a national capital market. According to our estimated model, 
adding a branch of the BOJ lowered rates in a prefecture by roughly 21 basis points. This 
result is consistent with the stated goal of the Bank of Japan at that time – to provide a 
means of funds transfers throughout the country and to facilitate market finance. The 
                                                 
44 Because the government created a special plan to promote the development of the telegraph in Hokkaido, 
we test whether this effect on interest rates is sensitive to Hokkaido’s inclusion in the sample.
44 When 
equation 1 is re-estimated with Hokkaido omitted from the sample, the effect of the telegraph on lending 
rates changes very little; indeed, the size of the effect is approximately 29% larger when Hokkaido is 
excluded.   21
Osaka branch nicely illustrates how BOJ branch offices played a role in integrating 
financial markets. Both the head office and the Osaka Branch discounted and purchased 
bills between Tokyo and Osaka, which Tsurumi (1991) suggests “virtually alleviated the 
remaining separations between the Tokyo and Osaka financial markets.”
45
 Imuta (1980) 
examined a slightly later period of branch expansion, but he also emphasizes the merits to 
local banks when there was a Bank of Japan branch in the same prefecture. He suggests 
that the opening of a Bank of Japan branch in the same prefecture enabled local banks to 
deal directly with the Bank of Japan and thus eased the movement of funds to and from 




There is some evidence that local characteristics such as default risk affected 
lending rates, even when we condition on other variables. For example, a one-percent 
change in the price of land for other agricultural crops prices lowered lending rates by 
roughly 85 basis points relative to the mean. However, we find little evidence that the 
variables we used to characterize the competitive environment – merger rates, voluntary 
liquidation rates, and bank entry rates – shaped lending rates. Although the coefficients 
have the correct predicted signs (negative for bank entry and positive for voluntary 
liquidations and mergers), they are not statistically significant at conventional levels 
(column 2), and bank mergers is the only one of them that is statistically significant in the 
OLS specification (column 1). Their lack of statistical significance may not be surprising 
since entry regulations were non-binding in the Meiji-Taisho era. If we had found these 
variables to be statistically significant, it might have suggested that differences in 
regulation mattered; however, as Okazaki and Sawada (2006) and others have suggested, 
greater involvement in entry regulation did not occur until the time of the Showa 
financial crisis – after our sample period ends. This evidence also suggests that the 
Japanese capital market at the start of our period is better characterized by 
underdevelopment rather than lack of competition. That is, once other factors such as 
                                                 
45 Tsurumi (1991, pp. 238-239).  
46 Imuta (1980) says that “the switch from correspondent transactions to current account overdrafts that 
resulted from the opening of a Bank of Japan office in the same prefecture presumably increased the 
convenience with which Bank of Japan credits could be accepted.” (p. 52) He also emphasizes the 
importance to private banks of transactions with the Bank of Japan not only for funds transfers but also to 
take advantage of the convenience of current account overdrafts. See Imuta (1980, pp. 50-52).    22
financial market innovation (branch banking) and institutional development are 
accounted for, competition is not of primary importance in explaining movements of 
interest rates. 
  If we are willing to assume that the random error associated with each prefecture 
is uncorrelated with the independent variables, we can also estimate a random effects 
model (column 3). The results are robust to this specification test. The signs on the 
estimated coefficients for our measures of commercial bank branching, BOJ branches, 
and telegraph transmissions do not change, and the results are still statistically significant 
at conventional levels. In addition, there are additional signs that differences in risk may 
have been important, since two of our proxies are now statistically significant and 
negative (rice field land prices and farm field land prices).   
As an alternative way of specifying the movement of interest rates over time, the 
last two columns of Table 3 define a prefecture’s interest rate relative to either Tokyo 
(column 4) or Osaka’s rate (column 5). Since these were the two major financial centers 
in Japan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these regressions test which 
factors accelerated or hindered the movement towards the rate that prevailed in the 
largest and most liquid financial markets of the nation.
47 The results relative to either 
Tokyo or Osaka are quite similar to those shown for the regressions relative to the mean, 
and the explanatory variables explain a considerable amount of the variation in either of 
the dependent variables.
48   Growth in commercial bank branches, telegraphic 
transmissions, and the BOJ branches all reduced a prefecture’s lending rate relative to the 
rate prevailing in the financial center. Moreover, all these variables are statistically 
significant at conventional levels.
49  
 
C. Corroborative Archival Evidence 
 
                                                 
47 We also considered alternative specifications to take into account the possibility of endogeneity. When 
we re-estimated the three fixed-effects models shown in Table 3 with lagged values of land prices, average 
loan size, and bank entry, the results were quite similar to those shown in the table. 
48 The (within) R-squared is 0.61 when the rate is defined relative to Tokyo and 0.47 when the rate is 
relative to Osaka. The signs and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients is quite similar to those 
shown in columns 4 and 5 if a random effects model is employed (not reported). 
49 In an OLS regression without fixed effects, distance is positive and statistically significant when the 
dependent variable is defined with respect to the rate in Osaka or Tokyo.    23
Let us now take a closer look at the funds transfer services provided by a Bank of 
Japan branch.
50  Specifically, let us examine the Bank of Japan Saibu Branch, which 
opened in 1893. The Saibu Branch was the second branch office after Osaka. It was 
initially established in Akamagaseki (now Shimonoseki) in Yamaguchi Prefecture, but in 
1898, it moved to Moji (now Kitakyushu) in Fukuoka Prefecture. The major industries in 
this region were coal mining and rice production, and it had active financial dealings with 
Osaka, which served as the trade center.
51  
The Saibu Branch’s first manager described the local financial situation before the 
branch opened as “about ¥10 million a year in rice, coal and other industrial sales outside 
of Kyushu, with very few commodities other than these being sold. In other words, it was 
always a one-sided funds transfer. Even offsetting payments to the treasury in Kyushu, it 
was still necessary to send ¥4-5 million in cash every year from Osaka. Therefore, 
interest rates were ¥0.02-0.03 per day higher than Osaka.”
52 The movement of funds to 
the region was not necessarily sufficient to cover local demand, and higher interest rates 
may have reflected the risk of cash transfers or arbitrage opportunities. With the opening 
of the Saibu Branch, funds transfers could be made over the secure Bank of Japan 
network. This likely facilitated the movement of funds and drove down rates.  
The details of funds transfers can be found in the “Bank of Japan Business 
Report.”
53 While there were changes over time in the direction of funds inflows and 
outflows,
54 the volume of funds transferred over the Bank of Japan network increased 
each year after a branch was established. Kasuya (1991, p.178) says that by 1902 the 
Moji Branch of the Mitsui Bank was “transferring enormous sums of funds over the Bank 
                                                 
50 In this section, we draw on archival work found in Ohnuki (2007). For Bank of Japan funds transfers, 
Tsurumi (1991) uses the period from the latter half of 1883 to the first half of 1888, during which time the 
activities of the transfer clearinghouses declined. His analysis distinguishes between government transfers 
and civil transfers for transfers between Bank of Japan offices and between the Bank of Japan and private-
sector banks. See Tsurumi (1991, pp. 144-151).  
51 Tokyo and Osaka account for the large majority of the total funds transfers of all Bank of Japan offices. 
52 Takahashi (1976, p. 35).  
53 In Bank of Japan, Research Department (1957b, 1958b). The first “Bank of Japan Business Report” was 
issued in 1888.  
54 Looking at the regional breakdown of the Saibu Branch’s flow of funds, in most years the Saibu Branch 
had a small net inflow of funds vis–a-vis the head office, while Kyoto, Nagoya and Fukushima (listed in 
aggregate as “others” in the table) had fairly consistent net outflows. By contrast, vis-a-vis the Osaka 
Branch there were net inflows until 1895, but this reversed in 1896 and there were large, consistent net 
outflows thereafter.   24
of Japan telegraphic transfers network from the head office and its Osaka branch.
55 
Mukai (2000) says that “during the Meiji Period, even the zaibatsu-affiliated city banks... 
used the Bank of Japan branch office network for transfers of funds from the head 
office.”
56  
There is also evidence that the Bank of Japan network helped to alleviate the 
regional funding bias through payments-side funds transfers between remote regions. The 
“Osaka Bank Report” of 1907 argued that the flow of funds was substantially smoother in 
regions with Bank of Japan offices.
57 As the report notes, “The benefits to be enjoyed by 
banks when transferring funds depend entirely upon whether they or the counterparty 
bank are located in areas where there are Bank of Japan offices.” In other words, having a 




After the Meiji restoration, Japanese policymakers began to experiment with 
western institutions and technologies in order to modernize their economy, but the 
process was one of trial and error. Shortly after Emperor Meiji assumed the thrown, the 
Japanese banking system was transformed by the creation of national banks, which were 
modeled after institutions that went by the same name in the United States. However, 
recognizing the weaknesses of a banking system centered on these banks, Japanese 
policymakers continued their process of institutional adoption and innovation, creating a 
banking system that by the end of the nineteenth century looked noticeably different from 
the U.S. system. In particular, policymakers had replaced national banks with alternative 
                                                 
55 According to the minutes of a branch managers meeting of the Mitsui Bank held in November 1905, 
Senshiro Kanezuka, the Manager of the Moji Branch spoke on “the reason for the recent sharp falls in 
interest rates in Shimonoseki and Moji and the prospects for the future.” He noted that “money is not 
flowing in to Kyushu from other regions but flowing out recently to other regions through the Bank of 
Japan so that the decline in interest rates is not unreasonable”  In other words, he believed that declining 
interest rates for the Kyushu region were related to the relaxation of finance so that funds could be sent to 
other regions. This statement is also an indication that the Bank of Japan branch office network provided an 
important vehicle for the transfer of funds between regions at this time (Japan Business History Institute, 
1977, p. 153).  
56 Mukai (2000, p. 966).  
57 The Osaka Bank Report of 1907 was published under the name of Midori Kobayashi, and is contained in 
the section of Bank of Japan (1957a, pp. 21-24) entitled, of “The Bank of Japan and Funds Transfers,” and 
published by the Research Department.   25
types of commercial banks. They had encouraged these commercial banks to form 
branching networks, as in Canada and England. In 1882, the government created a central 
bank whose network of branches spread over the country by 1900.    
Along with a telegraph network, these institutional innovations had important 
implications for the creation of a national capital market in Japan. Using a new data set of 
annual lending rates for 47 Japanese prefectures, we show that differences in interest 
rates across Japanese prefectures declined between 1884 and 1925. The reduction in 
interest rate differentials between outlying prefectures and financial centers was 
influenced by both technology and institutions. The development of information 
networks used for lending, such as the telegraph, played an important role in capital 
market integration, while branch offices allowed commercial banks to gather better 
information about customers and market conditions and helped banks shift funds to 
where they could be most efficiently employed. Meanwhile, the establishment of satellite 
offices of the Bank of Japan reduced lending rates by facilitating funds transfers between 
regions. And in contrast to the U.S., regulation played an insignificant role in impeding 
capital market integration.  
The technological innovations and institutional developments that occurred during 
the Meiji and Taisho periods helped to transform Japan’s underdeveloped capital market 
into a more efficient, national market for lending and borrowing. This more efficient, 
national capital market likely proved important for Japan’s economic growth since there 
was relatively little foreign borrowing. However, it is still unclear whether capital market 
integration and the development of Japan’s banking system were necessary conditions for 
modern economic growth in Japan, and that remains as an important topic for future 
research.   26
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Coefficient of Variation of Average Quarterly Interest Rates for Japanese Prefectures 
 
 
Notes and Sources: This graph shows the coefficient of variation of lending rates for 47 
Japanese prefectures. Quarterly interest rates are three-month averages of monthly 
lending rates for individual prefectures based on data from the Ministry of Finance’s 
Ginkokyoku Nempo, and described further in the text.   33
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   Figure 6. Bank of Japan’s Branches in 1909 










































List of Prefectures:  
 
1.Hokkaido   2.Aomori  3.Iwate  4.Miyagi  5.Akita  6.Yamagata 
7.Fukushima  8.Ibaraki  9.Tochigi  10.Gunma  11.Saitama 
12.Chiba  13.Tokyo  14.Kanagawa  15.Niigata  16.Toyama 
17.Ishikawa  18.Fukui  19.Yamanashi  20.Nagano  21.Gifu 
22.Shizuoka  23.Aichi  24.Mie  25.Shiga  26.Kyoto  27.Osaka 
28.Hyogo  29.Nara  30.Wakayama  31.Tottori  32.Shimane 
33.Okayama  34.Hiroshima  35.Yamaguchi  36.Tokushima 
37.kagawa  38.Ehime  39.Kochi  40.Fukuoka  41.Saga  42.Nagasaki 
43.Kumamoto  44.Oita  45.Miyazaki  46.kagoshima  47.Okinawa   37
 
Table 1. Opening of the Bank of Japan’s Branches and 
Offices    
End of 
year  Total 
Head 
office  Branches  
Local 
Offices 
Location of Bank of Japan Branches 
and Offices outside of Tokyo 
            
1882 2  1  1  0  Osaka     
1883 2  1  1  0      
1884 2  1  1  0       
1885 2  1  1  0       
1886 2  1  1  0       
1887 2  1  1  0       
1888 2  1  1  0       
1889 2  1  1  0       
1890 2  1  1  0       
1891  4  1  1  2  Osaka, Gifu, Wakayama 
1892 3  1  1  1  Osaka,  Wakayama   
1893 7  1  2  4 
Osaka, Saibu, Sapporo, Hakodate, 
Nemuro, Wakayama 
1894 8  1  2  5 
Osaka, Saibu, Sapporo, Hakodate, 
Nemuro, Kyoto, Wakayama  
1895 6  1  3  2 
Osaka, Saibu, Hokkaido, Sapporo, 
Kyoto 
1896 6  1  3  2       
1897 8  1  4  3 
Osaka, Saibu, Hokkaido, Nagoya, 
Sapporo, Kyoto, Otaru 
1898 8  1  4  3       
1899 9  1  4  4 
Osaka, Saibu, Hokkaido, Nagoya, 
Sapporo, Kyoto, Otaru, Fukushima 
1900 9  1  4  4       
1901 9  1  4  4       
1902 9  1  4  4       
1903 9  1  4  4       
1904 9  1  4  4       
1905 10  1  4  5 
Osaka, Saibu, Hokkaido, Nagoya, 
Sapporo, Kyoto, Otaru, Fukushima, 
Hiroshima 
1906 9  1  4  4 
Osaka, Saibu, Nagoya, Sapporo, 
Kyoto, Otaru, Fukushima, Hiroshima 
1907 9  1  4  4      
1908 9  1  4  4       
1909 10  1  4  5 
Osaka, Saibu, Nagoya, Otaru, Kyoto, 
Hakodate, Fukushima, Hiroshima, 
Kanazawa  
              
Source: The Bank of Japan: First Hundred Years-Materials (1986).      
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of Banking Markets in Japanese Prefectures   
          
     Standard    
Variable   Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Average Annual Lending Rate    10.69 1.62 6.33  18.00
Bank Failures    0.71 4.61 0.00  100.00
Log Price of Land for Rice    3.60 0.31 2.40  4.36
Log Price of Land for other Agricultural Crops    2.34 0.51 0.90  3.85
Log Residential Land Price    4.17 0.80 2.36  6.83
Log Average Loan Size    12.61 1.41 7.56  17.28
Telegraph Transmissions per capita    0.89 0.89 0.00  5.50
Commercial Bank Branches    1.75 1.83 0.00  15.00
BOJ Bank Branches    0.19 0.46 0.00  3.00
BOJ Correspondent Relationships    3.30 3.04 0.00  22.00
Bank Merger Rate    1.28 5.59 0.00  100.00
Voluntary Liquidation Rate for Banks    0.69 4.10 0.00  100.00
Bank Entry Rate    10.60 31.22 0.00  575.00
Distance (kilometers from Tokyo or Osaka)    330.333 316.4232 0  1602.5
          
Sources: See the text for a detailed description of data sources.     Table 3. Regressions Explaining the Convergence in Interest Rates, 1884-1925
Relative to Relative to Relative to
Prefectural Prefectural Prefectural Relative to  Relative to 
Independent Variable Average Average Average Tokyo's Rate Osaka's Rate
Bank Failures 0.0117 0.0011 0.0019 0.0014 0.0026
(standard error) 0.0077 0.0069 0.0070 0.0069 0.0068
Price of Land for Rice -1.2428 *** -0.0429 -0.8496 *** 0.2783 0.0374
0.1549 0.5717 0.3594 0.5799 0.5687
Price of Land for other -0.2620 *** -0.8491 * -0.4410 *** -0.8243 * -0.9872 **
  agricultural crops 0.0677 0.4477 0.1690 0.4489 0.4719
Residential Land Price -0.1589 ** -0.0468 -0.0535 -0.1200 -0.1020
0.0815 0.1037 0.0921 0.1061 0.1079
Average Loan Size -0.2237 *** 0.0215 -0.0241 0.0626 0.0146
0.0418 0.0616 0.0573 0.0638 0.0631
Telegraph Transmissions 0.0116 -0.1906 ** -0.1704 ** -0.2930 *** -0.2033 **
  per capita 0.0696 0.0854 0.0780 0.0838 0.0956
Commercial Bank Branches -0.0958 *** -0.0450 * -0.0497 ** -0.0418 * -0.0471 *
0.0179 0.0256 0.0228 0.0256 0.0259
BOJ Bank Branches -0.1093 * -0.2066 *** -0.1772 ** -0.1924 *** -0.2011 **
0.0633 0.0890 0.0867 0.0888 0.0898
BOJ Correspondent 0.0113 0.0074 0.0083 0.0066 0.0067
  Relationships 0.0079 0.0105 0.0095 0.0106 0.0106
Bank Merger Rate 0.0097 ** 0.0038 0.0038 0.0032 0.0040
0.0041 0.0034 0.0035 0.0034 0.0035
Voluntary Liquidation Rate 0.0067 0.0059 0.0059 0.0053 0.0072
  for Banks 0.0066 0.0047 0.0049 0.0046 0.0046
Bank Entry Rate -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005
0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
Distance 0.0005 *** 0.0008 **
0.0001 0.0004
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1806 1806 1806 1766 1766
Estimation Method Pooled OLS Fixed Random Fixed Fixed
Effects Effects Effects Effects
Notes and Sources: Column 1 estimates pooled OLS and columns 2-5 estimates panel regressions based on
equation 1 in the text. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is the annual average lending rate in prefecture i, 
year t, minus the the mean across all prefectures. In columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is the annual average
lending rate in prefecture i, year t, minus the rate in Tokyo or Osaka, respectively. A constant term (not reported)
was also included. See the text for variable definitions and sources. Stars indicate significance at 1(***), 5(**), 
and 10(*) percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported below the estimated regression coefficients.  